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Author SHA1 Message Date
jared b6c17096b5 Merge development into main: search filter merge, workflow dup rejection, recurring-ticket loss alert, preview debounce (#58, #62, #88, #108)
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- Merge into current URL params instead of replacing them in Advanced Search (#58)
- Reject duplicate workflow transitions with a clear error (#62)
- Alert and record a lost recurring-ticket occurrence on creation failure (#88)
- Debounce the live markdown preview (#108)
2026-09-11 14:49:44 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 6bd1bb082a Debounce the live markdown preview (#108)
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updatePreview() was bound directly to the comment textarea's 'input'
event with no debounce, re-running the full markdown parser (regex
passes for headings, tables, links, footnotes, etc.) on every single
keystroke.

Wrapped it with the existing lt.debounce() helper (150ms) — the
initial preview render on enabling the toggle still happens
immediately; only the per-keystroke live updates are debounced.
Verified via jsdom with real timers: 10 rapid keystrokes within the
debounce window produce exactly one parse call instead of ten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:28:39 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 a4828c1b7b Alert and record a lost recurring-ticket occurrence on creation failure (#88)
RecurringTicketModel::claimForRun() deliberately advances next_run_at
before TicketModel::createTicket() runs, to prevent duplicate-ticket
floods if creation fails partway and the cron retries. The tradeoff:
if createTicket() then fails, that specific occurrence is gone forever
with no record anywhere an admin would normally look — the catch
block only wrote a line to stdout/the cron log.

Added recordMissedOccurrence(), called from both the "createTicket()
returned success:false" branch and the exception catch, which writes
an audit_log entry (entity_type='recurring_ticket', action_type='error')
and fires a new NotificationHelper::sendSystemAlert() — a generic
operational alert (unlike the ticket-specific notification methods,
it has no associated ticket) sent to the shared MATRIX_NOTIFY_USERS
list regardless of any per-event toggle, so a silently-skipped
recurring ticket surfaces immediately instead of requiring someone to
grep cron logs.

Verified against real MariaDB and a real webhook-capturing server:
calling the recorder writes the audit_log row with the failure reason
and schedule details, and fires the Matrix alert with the same
information.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:28:31 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 86ef91abcb Reject duplicate workflow transitions with a clear error (#62)
status_transitions already has a DB-level UNIQUE KEY on
(from_status, to_status), so a genuine duplicate pair was never
actually possible to insert — but hitting that constraint raw
surfaced as an opaque "An internal error occurred" to the admin
instead of a clear message, since manage_workflows.php only validated
from_status !== to_status before attempting the insert/update.

Added an explicit existence check before insert/update in both the
POST and PUT handlers (excluding the row's own ID on update), so the
common case — an admin re-adding or renaming into a pair that already
exists — gets a specific 409 with the conflicting pair named, instead
of a generic 500. Also added ORDER BY transition_id to
WorkflowModel::getAllTransitions() as a defense-in-depth backstop:
since it collapses rows into a PHP array keyed by
[from_status][to_status] with no defined winner otherwise, if the DB
constraint were ever weakened or bypassed, this at least makes which
row wins deterministic (most recently created).

Verified against a real running server + real MariaDB: creating a
duplicate active pair, a duplicate inactive pair, and updating a
different row into an existing pair are all correctly rejected with
the friendly message; updating a row to keep its own existing pair
succeeds; and a genuinely different pair still creates normally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:28:21 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 6d68af40e7 Merge into current URL params instead of replacing them in Advanced Search (#58)
Same root pattern as the earlier chart click-to-filter bug (#29):
performAdvancedSearch() built a brand-new URLSearchParams from only the
form's own fields and navigated to it, silently dropping any active
filter the form doesn't represent (e.g. a category/type filter applied
via a dashboard quick-filter pill or stats-widget click).
populateCurrentFilters() also only read search/status back out of the
URL into the form, not the date ranges/priority range/user fields the
form does control.

Fixed performAdvancedSearch() to start from the current URL's params
and only set/clear the ones this form actually represents, leaving
everything else untouched. Also fixed populateCurrentFilters() to
restore all of those fields, not just search/status — without that,
reopening the modal and submitting without touching anything would
now silently wipe date/priority/user filters that were active but
shown blank in the form (a new foot-gun the first fix alone would have
introduced).

Verified via jsdom: category/type/sort params not represented in the
form survive a search submission; page resets to 1; and reopening the
modal with an active created_from filter correctly restores it into
the form and preserves it on a no-op resubmit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:28:12 -04:00
jared aa8173941a Merge development into main: webhook timeout, comment-edit timeline fix, Bearer rate-limiting overhaul (#77, #80, #81, #82, #83, #87)
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- Add connect-timeout to Matrix webhook calls (#77)
- Include ticket_id in comment-edit audit log so it appears on the timeline (#87)
- Overhaul Bearer API rate limiting: real config, per-key isolation, skip session (#80, #81, #82, #83)
2026-09-11 14:11:48 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 1b1801696f Overhaul Bearer API rate limiting: real config, per-key isolation, skip session (#80, #81, #82, #83)
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Four interrelated gaps in the same rate-limiting path:

- #80: RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT/RATE_LIMIT_API were defined in config.php but
  RateLimitMiddleware never read them (hardcoded class constants
  instead), and they weren't in .env.example — a deployer editing them
  saw zero effect with no documented way to actually change the limit.
- #81: Bearer traffic was rate-limited purely by a shared IP bucket
  (the session-based half was a no-op for stateless clients, since a
  fresh session starts on every request). Two different API keys from
  the same host/NAT egress IP shared ONE bucket, so a chatty or
  misbehaving key could 429 a completely unrelated key's traffic.
- #82: X-RateLimit-* headers reported the meaningless session counter
  for Bearer clients instead of whatever bucket actually governed them.
- #83: RateLimitMiddleware::check() called session_start()
  unconditionally, before ApiKeyAuth even runs — continuous session-file
  churn and an unnecessary Set-Cookie on every stateless API request,
  using un-hardened cookie defaults since it runs before
  AuthMiddleware's hardening (which Bearer requests never reach anyway).

Fixed as one pass since they're the same code path: config.php now
reads RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT/RATE_LIMIT_API from .env (added there too,
documented); the middleware now extracts the raw Bearer token
(independent of ApiKeyAuth, so no DB round-trip needed before rate
limiting, and it works whether or not the token later turns out
valid) and rate-limits it via its own per-token bucket instead of
starting a session — the existing IP-based bucket still applies
underneath as defense-in-depth against volumetric abuse from one
network path, but each distinct key now gets real isolated headroom.
getStatus()/addHeaders() report that per-token bucket for Bearer
requests instead of the session counter.

Verified: a Bearer request creates zero session files (confirmed via
real session-directory file count before/after); two different keys
from different IPs are fully isolated (one exhausting its own 120/min
bucket has zero effect on the other); a config-driven RATE_LIMIT_API
override (e.g. 5) is correctly honored for session-based (non-Bearer)
traffic; X-RateLimit-* status correctly reflects the per-key bucket
for a Bearer request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:05:14 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 09cea2b388 Include ticket_id in comment-edit audit log so it appears on the timeline (#87)
AuditLogModel::getTicketTimeline() requires, for entity_type='comment'
rows, that details.ticket_id match the ticket being viewed.
logCommentCreate() and delete-comment's audit call both correctly
include it; update_comment.php's audit call only set
comment_text_preview, so an edited comment's audit row was written
(visible in the admin's global Audit Log) but never matched the
timeline's join condition — a comment edit left no trace on the
ticket's own history, while deleting the same comment would be
visible.

Added ticket_id to the details array, using $comment['ticket_id']
already loaded earlier in the file for the access check. Verified
against real MariaDB: the fixed shape now correctly appears in
getTicketTimeline()'s results.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:05:01 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 9702aafacd Add connect-timeout to Matrix webhook calls (#77)
NotificationHelper::fire() set CURLOPT_TIMEOUT (10s total) but no
CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, so a slow-but-not-hung hookshot endpoint could
add up to the full 10s per fire() call — and a single request can call
fire() more than once sequentially (e.g. add_comment.php firing
mention + comment + watcher notifications back to back), stacking into
tens of seconds of added latency on the user-facing response.

Added a 3s CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT so a slow-to-connect endpoint fails
fast without needing the full request to time out. Verified the
webhook still fires correctly end-to-end against a real local HTTP
server after the change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:04:52 -04:00
10 changed files with 298 additions and 41 deletions
+6
View File
@@ -84,3 +84,9 @@ LDAP_BASE_DN="dc=example,dc=com"
LDAP_USER_BASE="ou=people,dc=example,dc=com" LDAP_USER_BASE="ou=people,dc=example,dc=com"
; How long to cache avatar images locally (seconds, default 3600) ; How long to cache avatar images locally (seconds, default 3600)
AVATAR_CACHE_TTL=3600 AVATAR_CACHE_TTL=3600
; Session-based rate limits (requests per 60s window). These govern
; browser/session traffic on general and API endpoints respectively;
; Bearer-key API traffic is rate-limited separately, per API key.
RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT=100
RATE_LIMIT_API=60
+49 -2
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@@ -97,13 +97,39 @@ try {
exit; exit;
} }
$wf_active = (int)($data['is_active'] ?? 1);
// status_transitions already has a DB-level UNIQUE KEY on
// (from_status, to_status) (regardless of is_active), so a
// duplicate pair can't actually be inserted — but hitting that
// constraint raw surfaces as an opaque "internal error occurred"
// to the admin instead of a clear message. Check first so the
// common case (an admin re-adding a pair that already exists)
// gets a friendly, specific error.
$dupCheck = $conn->prepare(
"SELECT transition_id FROM status_transitions WHERE from_status = ? AND to_status = ?"
);
$dupCheck->bind_param('ss', $data['from_status'], $data['to_status']);
$dupCheck->execute();
if ($dupCheck->get_result()->fetch_assoc()) {
$dupCheck->close();
http_response_code(409);
echo json_encode([
'success' => false,
'error' => 'A transition already exists for '
. $data['from_status'] . ' → ' . $data['to_status']
. ' — edit that row instead of creating a duplicate.',
]);
exit;
}
$dupCheck->close();
$stmt = $conn->prepare("INSERT INTO status_transitions (from_status, to_status, requires_comment, requires_admin, is_active) $stmt = $conn->prepare("INSERT INTO status_transitions (from_status, to_status, requires_comment, requires_admin, is_active)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)"); VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)");
$wf_from = $data['from_status']; $wf_from = $data['from_status'];
$wf_to = $data['to_status']; $wf_to = $data['to_status'];
$wf_comment = (int)($data['requires_comment'] ?? 0); $wf_comment = (int)($data['requires_comment'] ?? 0);
$wf_admin = (int)($data['requires_admin'] ?? 0); $wf_admin = (int)($data['requires_admin'] ?? 0);
$wf_active = (int)($data['is_active'] ?? 1);
$stmt->bind_param('ssiii', $wf_from, $wf_to, $wf_comment, $wf_admin, $wf_active); $stmt->bind_param('ssiii', $wf_from, $wf_to, $wf_comment, $wf_admin, $wf_active);
if ($stmt->execute()) { if ($stmt->execute()) {
@@ -149,6 +175,28 @@ try {
exit; exit;
} }
$wf_active = (int)($data['is_active'] ?? 1);
// Same duplicate-pair guard as create, excluding this row itself.
$dupCheck = $conn->prepare(
"SELECT transition_id FROM status_transitions
WHERE from_status = ? AND to_status = ? AND transition_id != ?"
);
$dupCheck->bind_param('ssi', $data['from_status'], $data['to_status'], $id);
$dupCheck->execute();
if ($dupCheck->get_result()->fetch_assoc()) {
$dupCheck->close();
http_response_code(409);
echo json_encode([
'success' => false,
'error' => 'A transition already exists for '
. $data['from_status'] . ' → ' . $data['to_status']
. ' — edit that row instead of creating a duplicate.',
]);
exit;
}
$dupCheck->close();
$stmt = $conn->prepare("UPDATE status_transitions SET $stmt = $conn->prepare("UPDATE status_transitions SET
from_status = ?, to_status = ?, requires_comment = ?, requires_admin = ?, is_active = ? from_status = ?, to_status = ?, requires_comment = ?, requires_admin = ?, is_active = ?
WHERE transition_id = ?"); WHERE transition_id = ?");
@@ -156,7 +204,6 @@ try {
$wf_to = $data['to_status']; $wf_to = $data['to_status'];
$wf_comment = (int)($data['requires_comment'] ?? 0); $wf_comment = (int)($data['requires_comment'] ?? 0);
$wf_admin = (int)($data['requires_admin'] ?? 0); $wf_admin = (int)($data['requires_admin'] ?? 0);
$wf_active = (int)($data['is_active'] ?? 1);
$stmt->bind_param('ssiiii', $wf_from, $wf_to, $wf_comment, $wf_admin, $wf_active, $id); $stmt->bind_param('ssiiii', $wf_from, $wf_to, $wf_comment, $wf_admin, $wf_active, $id);
$success = $stmt->execute(); $success = $stmt->execute();
+4 -1
View File
@@ -104,7 +104,10 @@ try {
'update', 'update',
'comment', 'comment',
(string)$commentId, (string)$commentId,
['comment_text_preview' => substr($commentText, 0, 100)] [
'ticket_id' => $comment['ticket_id'] ?? null,
'comment_text_preview' => substr($commentText, 0, 100),
]
); );
} }
+28 -7
View File
@@ -61,25 +61,46 @@ function populateCurrentFilters() {
const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search); const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
// Search text // Search text
if (urlParams.has('search')) { document.getElementById('adv-search-text').value = urlParams.get('search') || '';
document.getElementById('adv-search-text').value = urlParams.get('search');
}
// Status // Status
if (urlParams.has('status')) { const statuses = urlParams.has('status') ? urlParams.get('status').split(',') : [];
const statuses = urlParams.get('status').split(',');
const statusSelect = document.getElementById('adv-status'); const statusSelect = document.getElementById('adv-status');
Array.from(statusSelect.options).forEach(option => { Array.from(statusSelect.options).forEach(option => {
option.selected = statuses.includes(option.value); option.selected = statuses.includes(option.value);
}); });
}
// Date ranges
document.getElementById('adv-created-from').value = urlParams.get('created_from') || '';
document.getElementById('adv-created-to').value = urlParams.get('created_to') || '';
document.getElementById('adv-updated-from').value = urlParams.get('updated_from') || '';
document.getElementById('adv-updated-to').value = urlParams.get('updated_to') || '';
// Priority range
document.getElementById('adv-priority-min').value = urlParams.get('priority_min') || '';
document.getElementById('adv-priority-max').value = urlParams.get('priority_max') || '';
// Users
document.getElementById('adv-created-by').value = urlParams.get('created_by') || '';
document.getElementById('adv-assigned-to').value = urlParams.get('assigned_to') || '';
} }
// Perform advanced search // Perform advanced search
function performAdvancedSearch(event) { function performAdvancedSearch(event) {
event.preventDefault(); event.preventDefault();
const params = new URLSearchParams(); // Start from the CURRENT URL's params, not a fresh set, so a filter this
// form doesn't represent (e.g. a category/type filter applied via a
// dashboard quick-filter pill or stats-widget click) isn't silently
// dropped on submit. Only the params this form actually controls are
// set/cleared below; everything else passes through untouched.
const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
const advParams = [
'search', 'created_from', 'created_to', 'updated_from', 'updated_to',
'status', 'priority_min', 'priority_max', 'created_by', 'assigned_to',
];
advParams.forEach(key => params.delete(key));
params.delete('page'); // filters changed — reset to page 1
// Search text // Search text
const searchText = document.getElementById('adv-search-text').value.trim(); const searchText = document.getElementById('adv-search-text').value.trim();
+7 -2
View File
@@ -357,12 +357,17 @@ function togglePreview() {
if (isPreviewEnabled) { if (isPreviewEnabled) {
preview.innerHTML = parseMarkdown(textarea.value); preview.innerHTML = parseMarkdown(textarea.value);
textarea.addEventListener('input', updatePreview); textarea.addEventListener('input', debouncedUpdatePreview);
} else { } else {
textarea.removeEventListener('input', updatePreview); textarea.removeEventListener('input', debouncedUpdatePreview);
} }
} }
// Re-running the full markdown parser on every single keystroke is wasted
// work while the user is still mid-word; 150ms debounce keeps the preview
// feeling live without re-parsing on every keystroke.
const debouncedUpdatePreview = window.lt ? lt.debounce(updatePreview, 150) : updatePreview;
function updatePreview() { function updatePreview() {
const textarea = document.getElementById('newComment'); const textarea = document.getElementById('newComment');
const previewDiv = document.getElementById('markdownPreview'); const previewDiv = document.getElementById('markdownPreview');
+3 -3
View File
@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ $GLOBALS['config'] = [
], ],
'UPLOAD_DIR' => __DIR__ . '/../uploads', 'UPLOAD_DIR' => __DIR__ . '/../uploads',
// Rate limiting // Rate limiting (requests per minute; read by RateLimitMiddleware)
'RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT' => 100, // Requests per minute for general 'RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT' => (int)($envVars['RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT'] ?? 100), // Session-based, general endpoints
'RATE_LIMIT_API' => 60, // Requests per minute for API 'RATE_LIMIT_API' => (int)($envVars['RATE_LIMIT_API'] ?? 60), // Session-based, API endpoints
// Audit log settings // Audit log settings
'AUDIT_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS' => 90, 'AUDIT_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS' => 90,
+39 -1
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,38 @@ function logMessage($message)
echo "[" . date('Y-m-d H:i:s') . "] " . $message . "\n"; echo "[" . date('Y-m-d H:i:s') . "] " . $message . "\n";
} }
/**
* Record a recurring-ticket occurrence that was claimed (next_run_at already
* advanced to the next future run) but then failed to actually produce a
* ticket. That claim-then-fail ordering is deliberate — it stops a failing
* creation from re-firing and flooding duplicates on every subsequent cron
* tick — but means this specific occurrence has no other record anywhere an
* admin would normally look: no audit_log entry (nothing was created), no
* Matrix "ticket created" alert, no failure table. Without this, it's simply
* gone, silently, forever.
*/
function recordMissedOccurrence($auditLog, $recurring, $reason)
{
$auditLog->log(
$recurring['created_by'],
'error',
'recurring_ticket',
(string)$recurring['recurring_id'],
[
'reason' => $reason,
'title_template' => $recurring['title_template'],
'schedule_type' => $recurring['schedule_type'],
]
);
NotificationHelper::sendSystemAlert(
"Recurring ticket occurrence lost: schedule #{$recurring['recurring_id']} "
. "(\"{$recurring['title_template']}\") was claimed for this run but ticket "
. "creation failed, so this occurrence will not be created or retried.",
['reason' => $reason, 'recurring_id' => $recurring['recurring_id']]
);
}
logMessage("Starting recurring tickets cron job"); logMessage("Starting recurring tickets cron job");
try { try {
@@ -100,11 +132,17 @@ try {
$created++; $created++;
} else { } else {
logMessage("ERROR: Failed to create ticket - " . ($result['error'] ?? 'Unknown error')); $reason = $result['error'] ?? 'Unknown error';
logMessage("ERROR: Failed to create ticket - " . $reason);
recordMissedOccurrence($auditLog, $recurring, $reason);
$errors++; $errors++;
} }
} catch (Exception $e) { } catch (Exception $e) {
logMessage("ERROR: Exception processing recurring ticket - " . $e->getMessage()); logMessage("ERROR: Exception processing recurring ticket - " . $e->getMessage());
// claimForRun() already advanced next_run_at before this point, so
// this occurrence is permanently gone unless recorded somewhere an
// admin would actually look — a cron log line alone doesn't count.
recordMissedOccurrence($auditLog, $recurring, $e->getMessage());
$errors++; $errors++;
} }
} }
+23
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@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ class NotificationHelper
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, json_encode($payload)); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, json_encode($payload));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 10); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 10);
// A slow-but-not-fully-hung hookshot endpoint could otherwise add up
// to the full CURLOPT_TIMEOUT per fire() call, and a single request
// can call fire() (via notifyWatchers/sendCommentNotification/etc.)
// more than once sequentially — capping just the connect phase keeps
// that from stacking into tens of seconds of added latency.
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, 3);
$response = curl_exec($ch); $response = curl_exec($ch);
$httpCode = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE); $httpCode = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
@@ -53,6 +59,23 @@ class NotificationHelper
// ─── Public event methods ───────────────────────────────────────────────── // ─── Public event methods ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Generic operational alert with no associated ticket (e.g. a recurring
* schedule whose ticket creation failed after its next_run_at was
* already advanced, so the missed occurrence has no other record an
* admin would normally see). Always sent to the shared
* MATRIX_NOTIFY_USERS list, regardless of any per-event notify toggle.
*/
public static function sendSystemAlert(string $message, array $context = []): void
{
self::fire(array_merge([
'event' => 'system_alert',
'message' => $message,
], $context, [
'notify_users' => self::notifyUsers(),
]));
}
/** /**
* New ticket created (manual or automated/API). * New ticket created (manual or automated/API).
* *
+128 -20
View File
@@ -3,21 +3,34 @@
/** /**
* Rate Limiting Middleware * Rate Limiting Middleware
* *
* Implements both session-based and IP-based rate limiting to prevent abuse. * Implements session-based, IP-based, and (for Bearer-authenticated
* IP-based limiting prevents attackers from bypassing limits by creating new sessions. * requests) API-key-based rate limiting to prevent abuse.
* IP-based limiting prevents attackers from bypassing limits by creating new
* sessions; API-key-based limiting keeps distinct Bearer clients from
* starving each other's shared IP bucket.
*/ */
class RateLimitMiddleware class RateLimitMiddleware
{ {
// Default limits // Fallback limits, used only if $GLOBALS['config'] isn't populated
// (e.g. very early in bootstrap, or a test harness). Normal requests read
// RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT/RATE_LIMIT_API from config (backed by .env).
public const DEFAULT_LIMIT = 100; // requests per window (session) public const DEFAULT_LIMIT = 100; // requests per window (session)
public const API_LIMIT = 60; // API requests per window (session) public const API_LIMIT = 60; // API requests per window (session)
public const IP_LIMIT = 300; // IP-based requests per window (more generous) public const IP_LIMIT = 300; // IP-based requests per window (more generous)
public const IP_API_LIMIT = 120; // IP-based API requests per window public const IP_API_LIMIT = 120; // IP-based API requests per window
public const API_KEY_LIMIT = 120; // Per-Bearer-token requests per window
public const WINDOW_SECONDS = 60; // 1 minute window public const WINDOW_SECONDS = 60; // 1 minute window
// Directory for IP rate limit storage // Directory for IP rate limit storage
private static ?string $rateLimitDir = null; private static ?string $rateLimitDir = null;
private static function sessionLimit(string $type): int
{
$configKey = $type === 'api' ? 'RATE_LIMIT_API' : 'RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT';
$fallback = $type === 'api' ? self::API_LIMIT : self::DEFAULT_LIMIT;
return (int)($GLOBALS['config'][$configKey] ?? $fallback);
}
/** /**
* Get the rate limit storage directory * Get the rate limit storage directory
* *
@@ -69,24 +82,47 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
} }
/** /**
* Check IP-based rate limit * Extract the raw Bearer token from the Authorization header, if present.
* Deliberately independent of ApiKeyAuth: rate limiting must be cheap and
* must not require a DB round-trip to validate the key before counting
* the request, and needs to run whether or not the token turns out to be
* valid. The raw token string (not the validated api_key_id) is hashed as
* the bucket identifier — good enough to isolate distinct keys/clients
* from each other without needing to authenticate first.
* *
* @param string $type 'default' or 'api' * @return string|null
* @return bool True if request is allowed, false if rate limited
*/ */
private static function checkIpRateLimit(string $type = 'default'): bool private static function getBearerToken(): ?string
{ {
$ip = self::getClientIp(); $header = $_SERVER['HTTP_AUTHORIZATION']
$limit = $type === 'api' ? self::IP_API_LIMIT : self::IP_LIMIT; ?? $_SERVER['REDIRECT_HTTP_AUTHORIZATION']
$now = time(); ?? null;
if ($header === null && function_exists('getallheaders')) {
$headers = getallheaders();
$header = $headers['Authorization'] ?? null;
}
if ($header && preg_match('/^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i', $header, $m)) {
return $m[1];
}
return null;
}
// Create a hash of the IP for the filename (security + filesystem safety) /**
$ipHash = hash('sha256', $ip . '_' . $type); * Generic file-based sliding-window counter, shared by the IP-based and
$filePath = self::getRateLimitDir() . '/' . $ipHash . '.json'; * API-key-based buckets below.
*
* @param string $bucketKey Stable identifier for this bucket (already hashed)
* @param int $limit Max requests allowed per window
* @return bool True if this request is within the limit
*/
private static function checkCounter(string $bucketKey, int $limit): bool
{
$now = time();
$filePath = self::getRateLimitDir() . '/' . $bucketKey . '.json';
// Hold an exclusive lock across the whole read-modify-write so concurrent // Hold an exclusive lock across the whole read-modify-write so concurrent
// requests from the same IP can't both read the same count and each write // requests from the same bucket can't both read the same count and each
// count+1 (which would undercount and let the limit be exceeded). // write count+1 (which would undercount and let the limit be exceeded).
$fh = @fopen($filePath, 'c+'); $fh = @fopen($filePath, 'c+');
if ($fh === false) { if ($fh === false) {
// Can't open the counter file — fail open (don't block legitimate traffic). // Can't open the counter file — fail open (don't block legitimate traffic).
@@ -122,10 +158,60 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
flock($fh, LOCK_UN); flock($fh, LOCK_UN);
fclose($fh); fclose($fh);
// Check if over limit
return $rateData['count'] <= $limit; return $rateData['count'] <= $limit;
} }
/**
* Read (without incrementing) the current state of a counter bucket, for
* status/header reporting.
*/
private static function peekCounter(string $bucketKey, int $limit): array
{
$now = time();
$filePath = self::getRateLimitDir() . '/' . $bucketKey . '.json';
$rateData = null;
$content = @file_get_contents($filePath);
if ($content !== false && $content !== '') {
$decoded = json_decode($content, true);
if (is_array($decoded)) {
$rateData = $decoded;
}
}
if ($rateData === null || $now - ($rateData['window_start'] ?? $now) >= self::WINDOW_SECONDS) {
return ['limit' => $limit, 'remaining' => $limit, 'reset' => $now + self::WINDOW_SECONDS];
}
return [
'limit' => $limit,
'remaining' => max(0, $limit - $rateData['count']),
'reset' => $rateData['window_start'] + self::WINDOW_SECONDS,
];
}
private static function ipBucketKey(string $type): string
{
return hash('sha256', self::getClientIp() . '_' . $type);
}
private static function apiKeyBucketKey(string $token): string
{
return hash('sha256', 'apikey_' . $token);
}
/**
* Check IP-based rate limit
*
* @param string $type 'default' or 'api'
* @return bool True if request is allowed, false if rate limited
*/
private static function checkIpRateLimit(string $type = 'default'): bool
{
$limit = $type === 'api' ? self::IP_API_LIMIT : self::IP_LIMIT;
return self::checkCounter(self::ipBucketKey($type), $limit);
}
/** /**
* Clean up old rate limit files (call periodically) * Clean up old rate limit files (call periodically)
* *
@@ -185,7 +271,14 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
} }
/** /**
* Check rate limit for current request (both session and IP) * Check rate limit for current request.
*
* Bearer-authenticated requests (Authorization: Bearer ...) are limited
* by a per-token bucket instead of a session — a stateless API client
* never sends a session cookie back, so the session-based counter never
* accumulates and starting a session for it is pure overhead. The
* IP-based bucket still applies underneath as defense-in-depth against
* volumetric abuse from one network path.
* *
* @param string $type 'default' or 'api' * @param string $type 'default' or 'api'
* @return bool True if request is allowed, false if rate limited * @return bool True if request is allowed, false if rate limited
@@ -197,12 +290,17 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
return false; return false;
} }
$token = self::getBearerToken();
if ($token !== null) {
return self::checkCounter(self::apiKeyBucketKey($token), self::API_KEY_LIMIT);
}
// Then check session-based rate limit // Then check session-based rate limit
if (session_status() === PHP_SESSION_NONE) { if (session_status() === PHP_SESSION_NONE) {
session_start(); session_start();
} }
$limit = $type === 'api' ? self::API_LIMIT : self::DEFAULT_LIMIT; $limit = self::sessionLimit($type);
$key = 'rate_limit_' . $type; $key = 'rate_limit_' . $type;
$now = time(); $now = time();
@@ -270,18 +368,28 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
} }
/** /**
* Get current rate limit status * Get current rate limit status.
*
* For a Bearer-authenticated request, reports the per-API-key bucket
* (the one that actually governs it) rather than the session-based
* counter, which is meaningless for a client that never sends a session
* cookie back.
* *
* @param string $type 'default' or 'api' * @param string $type 'default' or 'api'
* @return array Rate limit status * @return array Rate limit status
*/ */
public static function getStatus(string $type = 'default'): array public static function getStatus(string $type = 'default'): array
{ {
$token = self::getBearerToken();
if ($token !== null) {
return self::peekCounter(self::apiKeyBucketKey($token), self::API_KEY_LIMIT);
}
if (session_status() === PHP_SESSION_NONE) { if (session_status() === PHP_SESSION_NONE) {
session_start(); session_start();
} }
$limit = $type === 'api' ? self::API_LIMIT : self::DEFAULT_LIMIT; $limit = self::sessionLimit($type);
$key = 'rate_limit_' . $type; $key = 'rate_limit_' . $type;
$now = time(); $now = time();
+7 -1
View File
@@ -31,9 +31,15 @@ class WorkflowModel
return $cached; return $cached;
} }
// ORDER BY makes which row wins deterministic (most recently created,
// by transition_id) in the pathological case where two active rows
// exist for the same (from_status, to_status) pair — manage_workflows.php
// now rejects creating that duplicate going forward, but this is a
// defense-in-depth backstop against any duplicate already in the DB.
$sql = "SELECT from_status, to_status, requires_comment, requires_admin $sql = "SELECT from_status, to_status, requires_comment, requires_admin
FROM status_transitions FROM status_transitions
WHERE is_active = TRUE"; WHERE is_active = TRUE
ORDER BY transition_id ASC";
$result = $this->conn->query($sql); $result = $this->conn->query($sql);
if (!$result) { if (!$result) {