Compare commits

...
Author SHA1 Message Date
jared aa8173941a Merge development into main: webhook timeout, comment-edit timeline fix, Bearer rate-limiting overhaul (#77, #80, #81, #82, #83, #87)
Lint / PHP (phpcs PSR-12) (push) Successful in 43s
Lint / JS (eslint) (push) Successful in 12s
Lint / PHP requirements (version + extensions) (push) Successful in 30s
Lint / Notify on failure (push) Skipped
Security / PHP Security (semgrep) (push) Successful in 2m4s
Lint / Deploy (push) Successful in 3s
- Add connect-timeout to Matrix webhook calls (#77)
- Include ticket_id in comment-edit audit log so it appears on the timeline (#87)
- Overhaul Bearer API rate limiting: real config, per-key isolation, skip session (#80, #81, #82, #83)
2026-09-11 14:11:48 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 1b1801696f Overhaul Bearer API rate limiting: real config, per-key isolation, skip session (#80, #81, #82, #83)
Lint / PHP (phpcs PSR-12) (push) Successful in 28s
Lint / JS (eslint) (push) Successful in 12s
Lint / PHP requirements (version + extensions) (push) Successful in 30s
Lint / Notify on failure (push) Skipped
Security / PHP Security (semgrep) (push) Successful in 3m9s
Lint / Deploy (push) Successful in 2s
Four interrelated gaps in the same rate-limiting path:

- #80: RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT/RATE_LIMIT_API were defined in config.php but
  RateLimitMiddleware never read them (hardcoded class constants
  instead), and they weren't in .env.example — a deployer editing them
  saw zero effect with no documented way to actually change the limit.
- #81: Bearer traffic was rate-limited purely by a shared IP bucket
  (the session-based half was a no-op for stateless clients, since a
  fresh session starts on every request). Two different API keys from
  the same host/NAT egress IP shared ONE bucket, so a chatty or
  misbehaving key could 429 a completely unrelated key's traffic.
- #82: X-RateLimit-* headers reported the meaningless session counter
  for Bearer clients instead of whatever bucket actually governed them.
- #83: RateLimitMiddleware::check() called session_start()
  unconditionally, before ApiKeyAuth even runs — continuous session-file
  churn and an unnecessary Set-Cookie on every stateless API request,
  using un-hardened cookie defaults since it runs before
  AuthMiddleware's hardening (which Bearer requests never reach anyway).

Fixed as one pass since they're the same code path: config.php now
reads RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT/RATE_LIMIT_API from .env (added there too,
documented); the middleware now extracts the raw Bearer token
(independent of ApiKeyAuth, so no DB round-trip needed before rate
limiting, and it works whether or not the token later turns out
valid) and rate-limits it via its own per-token bucket instead of
starting a session — the existing IP-based bucket still applies
underneath as defense-in-depth against volumetric abuse from one
network path, but each distinct key now gets real isolated headroom.
getStatus()/addHeaders() report that per-token bucket for Bearer
requests instead of the session counter.

Verified: a Bearer request creates zero session files (confirmed via
real session-directory file count before/after); two different keys
from different IPs are fully isolated (one exhausting its own 120/min
bucket has zero effect on the other); a config-driven RATE_LIMIT_API
override (e.g. 5) is correctly honored for session-based (non-Bearer)
traffic; X-RateLimit-* status correctly reflects the per-key bucket
for a Bearer request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:05:14 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 09cea2b388 Include ticket_id in comment-edit audit log so it appears on the timeline (#87)
AuditLogModel::getTicketTimeline() requires, for entity_type='comment'
rows, that details.ticket_id match the ticket being viewed.
logCommentCreate() and delete-comment's audit call both correctly
include it; update_comment.php's audit call only set
comment_text_preview, so an edited comment's audit row was written
(visible in the admin's global Audit Log) but never matched the
timeline's join condition — a comment edit left no trace on the
ticket's own history, while deleting the same comment would be
visible.

Added ticket_id to the details array, using $comment['ticket_id']
already loaded earlier in the file for the access check. Verified
against real MariaDB: the fixed shape now correctly appears in
getTicketTimeline()'s results.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:05:01 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 9702aafacd Add connect-timeout to Matrix webhook calls (#77)
NotificationHelper::fire() set CURLOPT_TIMEOUT (10s total) but no
CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, so a slow-but-not-hung hookshot endpoint could
add up to the full 10s per fire() call — and a single request can call
fire() more than once sequentially (e.g. add_comment.php firing
mention + comment + watcher notifications back to back), stacking into
tens of seconds of added latency on the user-facing response.

Added a 3s CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT so a slow-to-connect endpoint fails
fast without needing the full request to time out. Verified the
webhook still fires correctly end-to-end against a real local HTTP
server after the change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 14:04:52 -04:00
jared 66bf82bf46 Merge development into main: visibility-notification pruning + CSRF UX + custom field type validation (#48, #50, #57, #73, #86)
Lint / PHP (phpcs PSR-12) (push) Successful in 30s
Lint / JS (eslint) (push) Successful in 10s
Lint / PHP requirements (version + extensions) (push) Successful in 32s
Lint / Notify on failure (push) Skipped
Security / PHP Security (semgrep) (push) Successful in 3m22s
Lint / Deploy (push) Successful in 6s
- Prune watchers when a ticket's visibility is tightened (#73)
- Re-check ticket visibility before surfacing in-app notifications (#48)
- Use lt.api instead of raw fetch() in notification bell (#57)
- Auto-retry once after CSRF token resync in lt.api (#86)
- Validate field_type against the allowed enum in custom field definitions (#50)
2026-09-11 13:48:20 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 fca0b42726 Validate field_type against the allowed enum in custom field definitions (#50)
Lint / PHP (phpcs PSR-12) (push) Successful in 31s
Lint / JS (eslint) (push) Successful in 13s
Lint / PHP requirements (version + extensions) (push) Successful in 39s
Lint / Notify on failure (push) Skipped
Security / PHP Security (semgrep) (push) Successful in 2m1s
Lint / Deploy (push) Successful in 6s
The setValue()/is_required/select-options half of this issue was
already fixed incidentally by #47's new api/ticket_custom_fields.php
endpoint. The remaining gap: createDefinition()/updateDefinition()
never validated field_type against the six values the schema's
enum() actually allows (text/textarea/select/checkbox/date/number), so
a malformed type could be stored via the admin API and break whatever
UI renders it later.

Added an ALLOWED_FIELD_TYPES allowlist check at the top of both
methods, returning the same ['success' => false, 'error' => ...] shape
they already use for a DB failure — api/custom_fields.php already
propagates that shape correctly with no changes needed there. Verified
against real MariaDB: an invalid field_type is rejected on both create
and update, while a valid one still succeeds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 13:31:33 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 ae12fcd6fd Auto-retry once after CSRF token resync in lt.api (#86)
lt.api's fetch wrapper (_apiFetchAuth in base.js — the live
implementation lt.api.* resolves to) already resynced
window.CSRF_TOKEN from a 403 response's csrf_token field, but still
threw immediately — every caller saw a raw "Invalid CSRF token" error
on the FIRST attempt, with no transparent retry. Since CsrfMiddleware's
token lifetime (1h) is shorter than the session idle timeout (5h),
this was a routine, fully recoverable case (an hour of page
inactivity, or a write in another tab rotating the shared token), not
a real rejection.

After resyncing the token from a 403 body that carries one, now
retries the original request exactly once with the fresh token before
surfacing an error — transparent to the caller on the common case,
with a `retried` flag preventing more than one retry so a genuinely
broken session still fails cleanly instead of looping. Verified via
jsdom with a mocked fetch: a 403-then-succeeds sequence resolves
successfully with exactly 2 network calls and the correct final
token; a persistently-403 sequence still throws after exactly 2 calls
(no infinite retry).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 13:31:25 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 5b96e75ff6 Use lt.api instead of raw fetch() in notification bell (#57)
layout_footer.php's loadNotifications() and "mark all read" handler
called fetch() directly instead of lt.api.*, violating the project's
own documented convention (README Dev Notes #20). api/bootstrap.php
rotates the CSRF token on every successful write and returns it in the
response's csrf_token field; lt.api.* reads that and updates
window.CSRF_TOKEN, but a raw fetch() never does — so after "mark all
read", the server had rotated its token but the client's cached one
was stale, causing the user's next write anywhere else in the app to
fail once with "Invalid CSRF token" before self-healing.

Replaced both fetch() calls with lt.api.get/post, which also drops the
now-redundant manual header/credentials boilerplate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 13:31:15 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 3db3749c46 Re-check ticket visibility before surfacing in-app notifications (#48)
All four notification queries in api/notifications.php (assign,
comment, status-change, mention) were scoped purely by
created_by/assigned_to/ticket_watchers membership and historical
audit_log contents — never by canUserAccessTicket(). If a ticket's
visibility was later tightened, or a user's group/watcher access
revoked, a notification still surfaced in their bell dropdown,
disclosing the ticket's title and that activity occurred even though
opening the ticket itself would now be blocked.

Batch-fetches the tickets referenced by all candidate notifications
(via the existing getTicketsByIds()) and filters out any whose current
state canUserAccessTicket() would reject for the requesting user,
before formatting the response — so a notification for a ticket the
user can no longer see simply disappears rather than lingering as a
disclosure. Verified against real MariaDB with a running server: an
assignment notification is visible while the user is the assignee of
a public ticket, and disappears once the ticket is reassigned away and
made confidential.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 13:31:08 -04:00
jaredandClaude Sonnet 5 9e83f8903a Prune watchers when a ticket's visibility is tightened (#73)
TicketModel::updateVisibility() only updated the tickets row — it
never touched ticket_watchers. A user watching a public ticket that's
later made confidential/internal, and who isn't creator/assignee/
admin/in the new visibility_groups, kept receiving Matrix
notifications (title + redacted activity preview) about a ticket
canUserAccessTicket() would now reject them from opening directly.

After a successful visibility update, re-evaluates every current
watcher against the new visibility rules via the same
canUserAccessTicket() check the rest of the app uses, and removes any
who no longer qualify. Verified against real MariaDB: tightening to
confidential correctly drops watchers with no standing access while
keeping an admin watcher; tightening to internal with a specific group
correctly keeps a watcher in that group and drops one who isn't.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Lhz7pGMaoTfL5sdYS5XiKv
2026-09-11 13:30:59 -04:00
10 changed files with 269 additions and 33 deletions
+6
View File
@@ -84,3 +84,9 @@ LDAP_BASE_DN="dc=example,dc=com"
LDAP_USER_BASE="ou=people,dc=example,dc=com"
; How long to cache avatar images locally (seconds, default 3600)
AVATAR_CACHE_TTL=3600
; Session-based rate limits (requests per 60s window). These govern
; browser/session traffic on general and API endpoints respectively;
; Bearer-key API traffic is rate-limited separately, per API key.
RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT=100
RATE_LIMIT_API=60
+40 -1
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,10 @@
require_once __DIR__ . '/bootstrap.php';
require_once dirname(__DIR__) . '/models/UserPreferencesModel.php';
require_once dirname(__DIR__) . '/models/TicketModel.php';
$prefsModel = new UserPreferencesModel($conn);
$ticketModel = new TicketModel($conn);
// ── POST: mark all read (update last_seen timestamp) ──────────────
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
@@ -204,7 +206,44 @@ foreach (array_merge($assignRows, $commentRows, $statusRows, $mentionRows) as $r
$all[] = $row;
}
usort($all, fn($a, $b) => strcmp($b['created_at'], $a['created_at']));
$all = array_slice($all, 0, 30);
// Re-check current ticket visibility before surfacing anything: a
// notification's audit_log entry reflects historical activity, but the
// ticket's visibility (or the user's group/watcher standing) may have
// tightened since. Without this, a notification still discloses the
// ticket's title and that activity occurred to someone who currently
// shouldn't see it, even though the ticket view's own access check would
// correctly reject them from opening it.
$candidateTicketIds = [];
foreach ($all as $row) {
$details = json_decode($row['details'] ?? '{}', true) ?? [];
$actionType = ($row['action_type'] === 'create' && $row['entity_type'] === 'comment')
? 'comment'
: $row['action_type'];
$tid = ($actionType === 'comment' || $actionType === 'mention')
? ($details['ticket_id'] ?? 0)
: $row['entity_id'];
if ($tid) {
$candidateTicketIds[(string)$tid] = true;
}
}
$ticketsById = !empty($candidateTicketIds)
? $ticketModel->getTicketsByIds(array_keys($candidateTicketIds))
: [];
$all = array_filter($all, function ($row) use ($ticketsById, $currentUser, $ticketModel) {
$details = json_decode($row['details'] ?? '{}', true) ?? [];
$actionType = ($row['action_type'] === 'create' && $row['entity_type'] === 'comment')
? 'comment'
: $row['action_type'];
$tid = (string)(($actionType === 'comment' || $actionType === 'mention')
? ($details['ticket_id'] ?? 0)
: $row['entity_id']);
$ticket = $ticketsById[$tid] ?? null;
return $ticket && $ticketModel->canUserAccessTicket($ticket, $currentUser);
});
$all = array_slice(array_values($all), 0, 30);
// Format for response
$notifications = [];
+4 -1
View File
@@ -104,7 +104,10 @@ try {
'update',
'comment',
(string)$commentId,
['comment_text_preview' => substr($commentText, 0, 100)]
[
'ticket_id' => $comment['ticket_id'] ?? null,
'comment_text_preview' => substr($commentText, 0, 100),
]
);
}
+10 -1
View File
@@ -2801,7 +2801,7 @@
};
// Patch lt.api — auth-aware wrapper (renamed to avoid strict-mode duplicate declaration)
async function _apiFetchAuth(method, url, body) {
async function _apiFetchAuth(method, url, body, retried) {
if (_authAccess && auth.isExpiringSoon()) await auth.refresh();
const opts = { method, headers: Object.assign({ 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }, csrfHeaders()) };
if (_authAccess) opts.headers['Authorization'] = 'Bearer ' + _authAccess;
@@ -2821,6 +2821,15 @@
// Resync CSRF token from any response body that carries a fresh one
// (bootstrap rotates on success and returns the current token on rejection).
if (data && data.csrf_token) global.CSRF_TOKEN = data.csrf_token;
// Auto-retry once on a stale-CSRF-token 403: the token lifetime (1h) is
// shorter than the session idle timeout (5h), so this is a routine,
// recoverable case (an hour of inactivity, or a write in another tab
// rotating the shared token) rather than a real rejection — resyncing
// above already has the fresh token, so silently resending once succeeds
// transparently instead of surfacing a confusing error on the first try.
if (resp.status === 403 && !retried && data && data.csrf_token) {
return _apiFetchAuth(method, url, body, true);
}
if (!resp.ok) {
const err = new Error(data.error || data.message || 'HTTP ' + resp.status);
err.data = data;
+3 -3
View File
@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ $GLOBALS['config'] = [
],
'UPLOAD_DIR' => __DIR__ . '/../uploads',
// Rate limiting
'RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT' => 100, // Requests per minute for general
'RATE_LIMIT_API' => 60, // Requests per minute for API
// Rate limiting (requests per minute; read by RateLimitMiddleware)
'RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT' => (int)($envVars['RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT'] ?? 100), // Session-based, general endpoints
'RATE_LIMIT_API' => (int)($envVars['RATE_LIMIT_API'] ?? 60), // Session-based, API endpoints
// Audit log settings
'AUDIT_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS' => 90,
+6
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ class NotificationHelper
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, json_encode($payload));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 10);
// A slow-but-not-fully-hung hookshot endpoint could otherwise add up
// to the full CURLOPT_TIMEOUT per fire() call, and a single request
// can call fire() (via notifyWatchers/sendCommentNotification/etc.)
// more than once sequentially — capping just the connect phase keeps
// that from stacking into tens of seconds of added latency.
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, 3);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$httpCode = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
+128 -20
View File
@@ -3,21 +3,34 @@
/**
* Rate Limiting Middleware
*
* Implements both session-based and IP-based rate limiting to prevent abuse.
* IP-based limiting prevents attackers from bypassing limits by creating new sessions.
* Implements session-based, IP-based, and (for Bearer-authenticated
* requests) API-key-based rate limiting to prevent abuse.
* IP-based limiting prevents attackers from bypassing limits by creating new
* sessions; API-key-based limiting keeps distinct Bearer clients from
* starving each other's shared IP bucket.
*/
class RateLimitMiddleware
{
// Default limits
// Fallback limits, used only if $GLOBALS['config'] isn't populated
// (e.g. very early in bootstrap, or a test harness). Normal requests read
// RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT/RATE_LIMIT_API from config (backed by .env).
public const DEFAULT_LIMIT = 100; // requests per window (session)
public const API_LIMIT = 60; // API requests per window (session)
public const IP_LIMIT = 300; // IP-based requests per window (more generous)
public const IP_API_LIMIT = 120; // IP-based API requests per window
public const API_KEY_LIMIT = 120; // Per-Bearer-token requests per window
public const WINDOW_SECONDS = 60; // 1 minute window
// Directory for IP rate limit storage
private static ?string $rateLimitDir = null;
private static function sessionLimit(string $type): int
{
$configKey = $type === 'api' ? 'RATE_LIMIT_API' : 'RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT';
$fallback = $type === 'api' ? self::API_LIMIT : self::DEFAULT_LIMIT;
return (int)($GLOBALS['config'][$configKey] ?? $fallback);
}
/**
* Get the rate limit storage directory
*
@@ -69,24 +82,47 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
}
/**
* Check IP-based rate limit
* Extract the raw Bearer token from the Authorization header, if present.
* Deliberately independent of ApiKeyAuth: rate limiting must be cheap and
* must not require a DB round-trip to validate the key before counting
* the request, and needs to run whether or not the token turns out to be
* valid. The raw token string (not the validated api_key_id) is hashed as
* the bucket identifier good enough to isolate distinct keys/clients
* from each other without needing to authenticate first.
*
* @param string $type 'default' or 'api'
* @return bool True if request is allowed, false if rate limited
* @return string|null
*/
private static function checkIpRateLimit(string $type = 'default'): bool
private static function getBearerToken(): ?string
{
$ip = self::getClientIp();
$limit = $type === 'api' ? self::IP_API_LIMIT : self::IP_LIMIT;
$now = time();
$header = $_SERVER['HTTP_AUTHORIZATION']
?? $_SERVER['REDIRECT_HTTP_AUTHORIZATION']
?? null;
if ($header === null && function_exists('getallheaders')) {
$headers = getallheaders();
$header = $headers['Authorization'] ?? null;
}
if ($header && preg_match('/^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i', $header, $m)) {
return $m[1];
}
return null;
}
// Create a hash of the IP for the filename (security + filesystem safety)
$ipHash = hash('sha256', $ip . '_' . $type);
$filePath = self::getRateLimitDir() . '/' . $ipHash . '.json';
/**
* Generic file-based sliding-window counter, shared by the IP-based and
* API-key-based buckets below.
*
* @param string $bucketKey Stable identifier for this bucket (already hashed)
* @param int $limit Max requests allowed per window
* @return bool True if this request is within the limit
*/
private static function checkCounter(string $bucketKey, int $limit): bool
{
$now = time();
$filePath = self::getRateLimitDir() . '/' . $bucketKey . '.json';
// Hold an exclusive lock across the whole read-modify-write so concurrent
// requests from the same IP can't both read the same count and each write
// count+1 (which would undercount and let the limit be exceeded).
// requests from the same bucket can't both read the same count and each
// write count+1 (which would undercount and let the limit be exceeded).
$fh = @fopen($filePath, 'c+');
if ($fh === false) {
// Can't open the counter file — fail open (don't block legitimate traffic).
@@ -122,10 +158,60 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
flock($fh, LOCK_UN);
fclose($fh);
// Check if over limit
return $rateData['count'] <= $limit;
}
/**
* Read (without incrementing) the current state of a counter bucket, for
* status/header reporting.
*/
private static function peekCounter(string $bucketKey, int $limit): array
{
$now = time();
$filePath = self::getRateLimitDir() . '/' . $bucketKey . '.json';
$rateData = null;
$content = @file_get_contents($filePath);
if ($content !== false && $content !== '') {
$decoded = json_decode($content, true);
if (is_array($decoded)) {
$rateData = $decoded;
}
}
if ($rateData === null || $now - ($rateData['window_start'] ?? $now) >= self::WINDOW_SECONDS) {
return ['limit' => $limit, 'remaining' => $limit, 'reset' => $now + self::WINDOW_SECONDS];
}
return [
'limit' => $limit,
'remaining' => max(0, $limit - $rateData['count']),
'reset' => $rateData['window_start'] + self::WINDOW_SECONDS,
];
}
private static function ipBucketKey(string $type): string
{
return hash('sha256', self::getClientIp() . '_' . $type);
}
private static function apiKeyBucketKey(string $token): string
{
return hash('sha256', 'apikey_' . $token);
}
/**
* Check IP-based rate limit
*
* @param string $type 'default' or 'api'
* @return bool True if request is allowed, false if rate limited
*/
private static function checkIpRateLimit(string $type = 'default'): bool
{
$limit = $type === 'api' ? self::IP_API_LIMIT : self::IP_LIMIT;
return self::checkCounter(self::ipBucketKey($type), $limit);
}
/**
* Clean up old rate limit files (call periodically)
*
@@ -185,7 +271,14 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
}
/**
* Check rate limit for current request (both session and IP)
* Check rate limit for current request.
*
* Bearer-authenticated requests (Authorization: Bearer ...) are limited
* by a per-token bucket instead of a session a stateless API client
* never sends a session cookie back, so the session-based counter never
* accumulates and starting a session for it is pure overhead. The
* IP-based bucket still applies underneath as defense-in-depth against
* volumetric abuse from one network path.
*
* @param string $type 'default' or 'api'
* @return bool True if request is allowed, false if rate limited
@@ -197,12 +290,17 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
return false;
}
$token = self::getBearerToken();
if ($token !== null) {
return self::checkCounter(self::apiKeyBucketKey($token), self::API_KEY_LIMIT);
}
// Then check session-based rate limit
if (session_status() === PHP_SESSION_NONE) {
session_start();
}
$limit = $type === 'api' ? self::API_LIMIT : self::DEFAULT_LIMIT;
$limit = self::sessionLimit($type);
$key = 'rate_limit_' . $type;
$now = time();
@@ -270,18 +368,28 @@ class RateLimitMiddleware
}
/**
* Get current rate limit status
* Get current rate limit status.
*
* For a Bearer-authenticated request, reports the per-API-key bucket
* (the one that actually governs it) rather than the session-based
* counter, which is meaningless for a client that never sends a session
* cookie back.
*
* @param string $type 'default' or 'api'
* @return array Rate limit status
*/
public static function getStatus(string $type = 'default'): array
{
$token = self::getBearerToken();
if ($token !== null) {
return self::peekCounter(self::apiKeyBucketKey($token), self::API_KEY_LIMIT);
}
if (session_status() === PHP_SESSION_NONE) {
session_start();
}
$limit = $type === 'api' ? self::API_LIMIT : self::DEFAULT_LIMIT;
$limit = self::sessionLimit($type);
$key = 'rate_limit_' . $type;
$now = time();
+11
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ class CustomFieldModel
{
private $conn;
// Must match custom_field_definitions.field_type's enum() in the schema.
private const ALLOWED_FIELD_TYPES = ['text', 'textarea', 'select', 'checkbox', 'date', 'number'];
public function __construct($conn)
{
$this->conn = $conn;
@@ -87,6 +90,10 @@ class CustomFieldModel
*/
public function createDefinition($data)
{
if (!in_array($data['field_type'] ?? '', self::ALLOWED_FIELD_TYPES, true)) {
return ['success' => false, 'error' => 'Invalid field_type'];
}
$options = null;
if (isset($data['field_options']) && !empty($data['field_options'])) {
$options = json_encode($data['field_options']);
@@ -129,6 +136,10 @@ class CustomFieldModel
*/
public function updateDefinition($fieldId, $data)
{
if (!in_array($data['field_type'] ?? '', self::ALLOWED_FIELD_TYPES, true)) {
return ['success' => false, 'error' => 'Invalid field_type'];
}
$options = null;
if (isset($data['field_options']) && !empty($data['field_options'])) {
$options = json_encode($data['field_options']);
+59
View File
@@ -773,9 +773,68 @@ class TicketModel
$stmt->bind_param("ssis", $visibility, $visibilityGroups, $updatedBy, $ticketId);
$result = $stmt->execute();
$stmt->close();
if ($result) {
$this->pruneWatchersForVisibility($ticketId, $visibility, $visibilityGroups);
}
return $result;
}
/**
* Remove any watchers who no longer qualify for a ticket's access rules
* after its visibility was tightened. Without this, a user watching a
* ticket that's later made confidential/internal (and who isn't
* creator/assignee/admin/in the new visibility_groups) keeps receiving
* Matrix notifications about a ticket canUserAccessTicket() would now
* reject them from opening directly.
*/
private function pruneWatchersForVisibility(string $ticketId, string $visibility, ?string $visibilityGroups): void
{
$ticket = $this->getTicketById($ticketId);
if (!$ticket) {
return;
}
// getTicketById() reflects the just-committed UPDATE, but set these
// explicitly so pruning is correct even if a caller reorders things.
$ticket['visibility'] = $visibility;
$ticket['visibility_groups'] = $visibilityGroups;
$sql = "SELECT tw.user_id, u.is_admin, u.`groups`
FROM ticket_watchers tw
JOIN users u ON tw.user_id = u.user_id
WHERE tw.ticket_id = ?";
$stmt = $this->conn->prepare($sql);
$stmt->bind_param('s', $ticketId);
$stmt->execute();
$watchers = $stmt->get_result()->fetch_all(MYSQLI_ASSOC);
$stmt->close();
$toRemove = [];
foreach ($watchers as $watcher) {
$watcherUser = [
'user_id' => $watcher['user_id'],
'is_admin' => $watcher['is_admin'],
'groups' => $watcher['groups'],
];
if (!$this->canUserAccessTicket($ticket, $watcherUser)) {
$toRemove[] = $watcher['user_id'];
}
}
if (empty($toRemove)) {
return;
}
$placeholders = implode(',', array_fill(0, count($toRemove), '?'));
$delSql = "DELETE FROM ticket_watchers WHERE ticket_id = ? AND user_id IN ($placeholders)";
$delStmt = $this->conn->prepare($delSql);
$types = 's' . str_repeat('i', count($toRemove));
$delStmt->bind_param($types, $ticketId, ...$toRemove);
$delStmt->execute();
$delStmt->close();
}
/**
* Delete a ticket and all its associated records.
* Admin-only operation. Removes comments, attachments, watchers, dependencies.
+2 -7
View File
@@ -235,8 +235,7 @@
}
function loadNotifications() {
return fetch('/api/notifications.php', { credentials: 'same-origin' })
.then(function(r) { return r.json(); })
return lt.api.get('/api/notifications.php')
.then(function(data) { renderNotifications(data); return true; })
.catch(function() {
list.innerHTML = '<div style="padding:0.75rem;font-size:0.75rem;color:var(--text-muted);text-align:center">Could not load</div>';
@@ -251,11 +250,7 @@
if (clearBtn) {
clearBtn.addEventListener('click', function() {
fetch('/api/notifications.php', {
method: 'POST', credentials: 'same-origin',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'X-CSRF-Token': window.CSRF_TOKEN || '' },
body: JSON.stringify({ action: 'mark_read' })
}).then(loadNotifications);
lt.api.post('/api/notifications.php', { action: 'mark_read' }).then(loadNotifications);
});
}