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cinny/src/app/features/room/message/forwardContent.ts
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fix(forward): warn when forwarding out of an encrypted room into one that is not (#330)
Forwarding from an encrypted room into an unencrypted one posts the text
(and a re-uploaded plaintext attachment) where the server can read it,
with the original author attached, and the dialog said nothing. Show a
note above Send naming the unencrypted destination(s).

Refs #330

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017PCb59uY3UKqDqt7B6hzd5
2026-10-17 23:40:58 -04:00

145 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript

import { MatrixClient, MatrixEvent } from 'matrix-js-sdk';
import { getEditedEvent, trimReplyFromBody, trimReplyFromFormattedBody } from '../../../utils/room';
import { decryptFile, downloadEncryptedMedia, mxcUrlToHttp } from '../../../utils/matrix';
import { FALLBACK_MIMETYPE } from '../../../utils/mimeTypes';
import { IEncryptedFile } from '../../../../types/matrix/common';
/**
* Build the content to forward:
* - undecryptable events are refused (would forward `m.bad.encrypted` junk)
* - edited messages forward the LATEST edit (`m.new_content`), not the
* original pre-edit body
* - reply fallbacks (`> <@user> …` quote + `<mx-reply>` block) are stripped
* along with the `m.relates_to` reply/thread relation, so the forwarded
* message stands alone in the target room
*/
/**
* Provenance stamped onto a forwarded event so the receiving client can show
* "Forwarded from <sender> in <room> · <time>" and jump to the original
* (Discord-style). `room_id`/`event_id` let a recipient who is also in the
* source room jump there; a recipient who is not just sees the sender + time
* (the source room's NAME is deliberately not included — it is not theirs to
* see). Other Matrix clients ignore the key and show the plain content.
*/
export const FORWARDED_KEY = 'io.lotus.forwarded';
export type ForwardedMeta = {
sender: string;
origin_server_ts: number;
room_id: string;
event_id: string;
};
export const getForwardedMeta = (content: Record<string, unknown>): ForwardedMeta | undefined => {
const raw = content[FORWARDED_KEY];
if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object') return undefined;
const m = raw as Partial<ForwardedMeta>;
if (typeof m.sender !== 'string' || typeof m.origin_server_ts !== 'number') return undefined;
return {
sender: m.sender,
origin_server_ts: m.origin_server_ts,
room_id: typeof m.room_id === 'string' ? m.room_id : '',
event_id: typeof m.event_id === 'string' ? m.event_id : '',
};
};
export function buildForwardContent(
mx: MatrixClient,
mEvent: MatrixEvent,
): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {
if (mEvent.isDecryptionFailure()) return undefined;
let content = { ...mEvent.getContent() };
const eventId = mEvent.getId();
const room = mx.getRoom(mEvent.getRoomId());
if (eventId && room) {
const editedEvent = getEditedEvent(eventId, mEvent, room.getUnfilteredTimelineSet());
const newContent = editedEvent?.getContent()['m.new_content'];
if (newContent && typeof newContent === 'object') {
content = { ...(newContent as Record<string, unknown>) };
}
}
delete content['m.relates_to'];
// Drop intentional mentions so forwarding a message doesn't re-ping the
// originally-mentioned users (they're not in the destination room's context).
delete content['m.mentions'];
if (typeof content.body === 'string') {
content.body = trimReplyFromBody(content.body);
}
if (typeof content.formatted_body === 'string') {
content.formatted_body = trimReplyFromFormattedBody(content.formatted_body);
}
// Forwarding a forward keeps the ORIGINAL provenance rather than chaining.
const existing = getForwardedMeta(content);
const meta: ForwardedMeta = existing ?? {
sender: mEvent.getSender() ?? '',
origin_server_ts: mEvent.getTs(),
room_id: mEvent.getRoomId() ?? '',
event_id: eventId ?? '',
};
content[FORWARDED_KEY] = meta;
return content;
}
/**
* `content.file` on an encrypted attachment carries the AES key/iv/hashes
* needed to decrypt it. Forwarding that content verbatim into a room that
* isn't itself encrypted would publish the key in plaintext to anyone who can
* read the destination room (Gitea #63). Re-encrypting for the destination is
* out of scope, so instead download+decrypt the attachment here and re-upload
* it as a plain (unencrypted) upload, sending `url` in place of `file`.
*
* Throws if the attachment can't be fetched/decrypted — callers must treat
* that as a hard failure for this forward rather than falling back to
* sending the encrypted `file` block into the plaintext room.
*/
export async function buildPlaintextAttachmentContent(
mx: MatrixClient,
content: Record<string, unknown>,
useAuthentication: boolean,
): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
const file = content.file as IEncryptedFile;
const info = content.info as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
const mimeType = (info?.mimetype as string | undefined) ?? FALLBACK_MIMETYPE;
const mediaUrl = mxcUrlToHttp(mx, file.url, useAuthentication);
if (!mediaUrl) throw new Error('Invalid attachment URL');
const blob = await downloadEncryptedMedia(mediaUrl, (buf) => decryptFile(buf, mimeType, file));
const uploadResult = await mx.uploadContent(blob, { type: mimeType });
const plainContent = { ...content };
delete plainContent.file;
plainContent.url = uploadResult.content_uri;
// The thumbnail can carry its own encryption key (`thumbnail_file`); drop it
// rather than leak it too — the full attachment still forwards fine without
// a thumbnail.
if (info && (info.thumbnail_file || info.thumbnail_url)) {
const { thumbnail_file: _tf, thumbnail_url: _tu, ...restInfo } = info;
plainContent.info = restInfo;
}
return plainContent;
}
/**
* [Gitea #330] The note shown when forwarding out of an encrypted room into
* rooms that aren't: the text (and a re-uploaded attachment) becomes readable
* by the server, and the original author is shown with it. Undefined when
* there's nothing to warn about.
*/
export function forwardEncryptionWarning(
sourceEncrypted: boolean,
unencryptedDestNames: string[],
): string | undefined {
if (!sourceEncrypted || unencryptedDestNames.length === 0) return undefined;
const where =
unencryptedDestNames.length === 1
? `${unencryptedDestNames[0]} isn't encrypted.`
: `${unencryptedDestNames.length} of the rooms you picked aren't encrypted.`;
return `${where} The forwarded message (and any attachment) will be readable by the server and everyone in ${
unencryptedDestNames.length === 1 ? 'that room' : 'those rooms'
}, along with who originally wrote it.`;
}