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MCP requests now run as the signed-in Tinker Tickets user, under exactly
the same rules as the web login, and expose the first two tools:
search_tickets and get_ticket.
Identity:
- IdentityMiddleware maps the validated token to a user with the same
checks as AuthMiddleware: the admin/employee group rule, now extracted
into helpers/AccessPolicy.php so both entry points share one copy, then
UserModel::syncUserFromAuthelia(), which creates/updates the row and
derives is_admin from groups.
- Claims are read from the validated token's server-side PSR-7 request
attributes, not from JSON-RPC _meta. The SDK's OAuthRequestMetaMiddleware
is deliberately not used: it array_merges into client-writable _meta,
so only the keys the validator happens to set are overwritten and a
client could inject others.
Scopes (ToolScopeMiddleware), enforced before dispatch:
- lifecycle messages need only a valid token; write tools (listed in
ToolCatalog, the single registry) need tickets:write; everything else
needs tickets:read, which tickets:write implies.
- Denials are the spec's step-up challenge: 403 +
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope=...,
resource_metadata=...
Tools (read-only, annotated readOnlyHint):
- search_tickets: text/status/priority/category/assignee ("me",
"unassigned", or a username), paginated, via TicketModel::getAllTickets
with the user's visibility filter. Defaults to every non-Closed status.
- get_ticket: details + comments, gated by canUserAccessTicket. A missing
ticket and a non-visible one return the same "not found".
Verified locally against a real MariaDB fixture (public, confidential,
internal+group, and closed tickets across two users), driving the real
pipeline (ToolCatalog, both middlewares, SDK transport) with only JWT
validation stubbed: 20/20 checks pass, including visibility parity per
user, confidential tickets hidden from non-owners, the group check
rejecting a user without admin/employee, a missing preferred_username
rejected, 403 insufficient_scope for a token without tickets:*, and
write implying read. Also exercised the stateless 2026-07-28 era (no
session, _meta + MCP-Protocol-Version/Mcp-Method/Mcp-Name headers), which
returns the same visibility-filtered results.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MGDKHiU5RJdo3dqQUDow3X
32 lines
988 B
PHP
32 lines
988 B
PHP
<?php
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/**
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* Who may use Tinker Tickets at all. Shared by the web login
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* (AuthMiddleware, from Authelia's Remote-Groups header) and the MCP endpoint
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* (from the OAuth access token's groups claim), so both entry points enforce
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* one rule instead of two copies that can drift apart.
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*/
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class AccessPolicy
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{
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/** Membership in any of these grants access. */
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private const REQUIRED_GROUPS = ['admin', 'employee'];
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/**
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* @param string $groups Comma-separated group names (Remote-Groups format)
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*/
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public static function hasAppAccess(string $groups): bool
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{
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if ($groups === '') {
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return false;
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}
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// Filter to safe characters only to prevent header injection attacks
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$userGroups = array_filter(
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array_map('trim', explode(',', strtolower($groups))),
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fn($g) => preg_match('/^[a-z0-9_\-]+$/', $g)
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);
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return !empty(array_intersect($userGroups, self::REQUIRED_GROUPS));
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}
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}
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