Trusted-proxy hardening (defense-in-depth for Authelia forward-auth):
- AuthMiddleware now only honors Remote-* identity headers when REMOTE_ADDR
is in a configured TRUSTED_PROXIES allowlist; otherwise it refuses with 403
and logs an 'untrusted_proxy' security event. Previously anything that could
reach PHP directly could spoof Remote-User/Remote-Groups and log in as admin.
- New config TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated, from .env). Empty = enforcement
off, so this is backward compatible until the allowlist is set on a host.
Requirements checks (so a PHP upgrade dropping an extension can't silently
break features like avatars again):
- config/requirements.php: single source of truth for min PHP version and
required extensions (ldap, mysqli, curl, mbstring, fileinfo, json).
- scripts/check_requirements.php: CI script that fails the build if the
environment doesn't satisfy them.
- New 'requirements' CI job installs those extensions and runs the check;
deploy now depends on it.
- api/health.php: adds php_extensions + php_version checks so production
monitoring surfaces the drift (returns 503 if a required extension is gone).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- TicketModel::getAllTickets() now accepts optional $user param and applies
getVisibilityFilter() so non-admin users cannot see internal/confidential
tickets they lack access to from the dashboard listing
- DashboardController passes $GLOBALS['currentUser'] to getAllTickets()
- clone_ticket.php: move Content-Type header to top so all error paths send
correct JSON content type
- AuthMiddleware: filter group names from HTTP header to [a-z0-9_-] only,
preventing header injection via malformed group names
- add_comment.php: return HTTP 201 on success, 500 in catch block
- update_comment.php, delete_comment.php: return 500 in catch blocks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security:
- Fix IDOR in delete/update comment (add ticket visibility check)
- XSS defense-in-depth in DashboardView active filters
- Replace innerHTML with DOM construction in toast.js
- Remove redundant real_escape_string in check_duplicates
- Add rate limiting to get_template, download_attachment, audit_log,
saved_filters, user_preferences endpoints
Bug fixes:
- Session timeout now reads from config instead of hardcoded 18000
- TicketController uses $GLOBALS['config'] instead of duplicate .env parsing
- Add DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL to centralized config
- Cleanup script uses hashmap for O(1) ticket ID lookups
Dead code removal (~100 lines):
- Remove dead getTicketComments() from TicketModel (wrong bind_param type)
- Remove dead getCategories()/getTypes() from DashboardController
- Remove ~80 lines dead Discord webhook code from update_ticket API
Consolidation:
- Create api/bootstrap.php for shared API setup (auth, CSRF, rate limit)
- Convert 6 API endpoints to use bootstrap
- Extract escapeHtml/getTicketIdFromUrl into shared utils.js
- Batch save for user preferences (1 request instead of 7)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Change session.cookie_samesite from Strict to Lax for Authelia compatibility
- Redesign sidebar toggle with separate collapse/expand buttons
- Add script to create missing ticket_dependencies table
- Add .env.example template
- Add check for missing .env with helpful error message
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Session security improvements in AuthMiddleware:
1. Secure Cookie Configuration:
- HttpOnly flag prevents JavaScript access to session cookies
- Secure flag requires HTTPS (protects from MITM)
- SameSite=Strict prevents CSRF via cookie inclusion
- Strict mode rejects uninitialized session IDs
2. Session Fixation Prevention:
- session_regenerate_id(true) called after successful authentication
- Old session ID destroyed, new one generated
- Prevents attacker from using pre-set session ID
3. CSRF Token Regeneration:
- New CSRF token generated on login
- Ensures fresh token for each session
These changes protect against session hijacking, fixation, and
cross-site attacks while maintaining existing 5-hour timeout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>