Add MCP identity mapping and read tools (#111, phase 4)
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MCP requests now run as the signed-in Tinker Tickets user, under exactly
the same rules as the web login, and expose the first two tools:
search_tickets and get_ticket.

Identity:
- IdentityMiddleware maps the validated token to a user with the same
  checks as AuthMiddleware: the admin/employee group rule, now extracted
  into helpers/AccessPolicy.php so both entry points share one copy, then
  UserModel::syncUserFromAuthelia(), which creates/updates the row and
  derives is_admin from groups.
- Claims are read from the validated token's server-side PSR-7 request
  attributes, not from JSON-RPC _meta. The SDK's OAuthRequestMetaMiddleware
  is deliberately not used: it array_merges into client-writable _meta,
  so only the keys the validator happens to set are overwritten and a
  client could inject others.

Scopes (ToolScopeMiddleware), enforced before dispatch:
- lifecycle messages need only a valid token; write tools (listed in
  ToolCatalog, the single registry) need tickets:write; everything else
  needs tickets:read, which tickets:write implies.
- Denials are the spec's step-up challenge: 403 +
  WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope=...,
  resource_metadata=...

Tools (read-only, annotated readOnlyHint):
- search_tickets: text/status/priority/category/assignee ("me",
  "unassigned", or a username), paginated, via TicketModel::getAllTickets
  with the user's visibility filter. Defaults to every non-Closed status.
- get_ticket: details + comments, gated by canUserAccessTicket. A missing
  ticket and a non-visible one return the same "not found".

Verified locally against a real MariaDB fixture (public, confidential,
internal+group, and closed tickets across two users), driving the real
pipeline (ToolCatalog, both middlewares, SDK transport) with only JWT
validation stubbed: 20/20 checks pass, including visibility parity per
user, confidential tickets hidden from non-owners, the group check
rejecting a user without admin/employee, a missing preferred_username
rejected, 403 insufficient_scope for a token without tickets:*, and
write implying read. Also exercised the stateless 2026-07-28 era (no
session, _meta + MCP-Protocol-Version/Mcp-Method/Mcp-Name headers), which
returns the same visibility-filtered results.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MGDKHiU5RJdo3dqQUDow3X
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-24 18:58:30 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 13660b4398
commit 65deedc295
8 changed files with 503 additions and 22 deletions
+2 -15
View File
@@ -263,21 +263,8 @@ class AuthMiddleware
*/
private function checkGroupAccess($groups)
{
if (empty($groups)) {
return false;
}
// Check for admin or employee group membership
// Filter to safe characters only to prevent header injection attacks
$userGroups = array_filter(
array_map('trim', explode(',', strtolower($groups))),
function ($g) {
return preg_match('/^[a-z0-9_\-]+$/', $g);
}
);
$requiredGroups = ['admin', 'employee'];
return !empty(array_intersect($userGroups, $requiredGroups));
require_once dirname(__DIR__) . '/helpers/AccessPolicy.php';
return AccessPolicy::hasAppAccess((string)($groups ?? ''));
}
/**