Only trust Authelia identity headers from the proxy
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Remote-User/Name/Email/Groups were read from every request, so a LAN host
connecting to the container directly could claim any user and group. Add
auth.trusted_proxies and ignore those headers unless the request came from
one of them: the X-Real-IP the local nginx sets, or the peer address when
gunicorn is reached directly. With nothing configured, nobody is trusted.
Rejected attempts are logged, and /api/avatar now uses the same check.

The container's nginx site blanks the same headers for non-NPM sources
(pve-infra 4e3ab7c).

Closes #3

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
jaredandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-11-10 13:23:24 -05:00
1 parent 93828b38e9
commit 5c4e4dc099
3 files changed
+102 -7

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+43 -1
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@@ -118,7 +118,44 @@ def _daemon_ok(last_check: str) -> bool:
# Auth helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _request_source() -> str:
"""The address the request came from.
Gunicorn listens on loopback behind the local nginx, which overwrites X-Real-IP
with the real peer address. A peer that isn't loopback reached gunicorn directly,
so its own address is the source and any X-Real-IP it sent is ignored.
"""
peer = request.remote_addr or ''
try:
if ipaddress.ip_address(peer).is_loopback:
return request.headers.get('X-Real-IP', '').strip()
except ValueError:
return ''
return peer
def _from_trusted_proxy() -> bool:
"""True when the request came through the Authelia-protected proxy.
Only then are the Remote-* identity headers real: anyone else on the LAN could
set them. Fails closed: with no auth.trusted_proxies configured, nobody is trusted.
"""
try:
source = ipaddress.ip_address(_request_source())
except ValueError:
return False
for entry in _config().get('auth', {}).get('trusted_proxies', []):
try:
if source in ipaddress.ip_network(entry, strict=False):
return True
except ValueError:
logger.error(f'Ignoring invalid auth.trusted_proxies entry {entry!r}')
return False
def _get_user() -> dict:
if not _from_trusted_proxy():
return {'username': '', 'name': '', 'email': '', 'groups': []}
return {
'username': request.headers.get('Remote-User', ''),
'name': request.headers.get('Remote-Name', ''),
@@ -136,6 +173,11 @@ def require_auth(f):
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
user = _get_user()
if not user['username']:
if request.headers.get('Remote-User'):
logger.warning(
f'Ignored identity headers from untrusted source {_request_source() or "unknown"!r}; '
f'only auth.trusted_proxies may send them'
)
return (
'<h1>401 – Not authenticated</h1>'
'<p>Please access Gandalf through '
@@ -626,7 +668,7 @@ def api_diagnose_poll(job_id: str):
@require_auth
def api_avatar():
"""Serve the current user's LDAP avatar photo (JPEG), cached to disk."""
username = request.headers.get('Remote-User', '').strip()
username = _get_user()['username'].strip()
if not username:
return '', 404