Location: repo settings (no branch protection on lotus, no CODEOWNERS), README.md "edit → commit → git push → ~11 min → live"
Problem
This is a deliberate velocity trade-off and may be exactly right for the team size, so this issue is a decision point rather than a defect. As it stands, any collaborator's direct push to lotus reaches every user with no second pair of eyes; combined with the upstream-merge bypass it means production can change with zero review and zero CI.
Suggested fix
At minimum, enable Gitea branch protection on lotus requiring the Build & Quality Checks status to pass before push (this alone closes the cancelled-run and merge-script gaps). Optionally require one approval for changes under src/app/features/call, src/app/utils/searchCache.ts, src/app/state/sessions.ts, and src/client/ — the areas where this audit found the security-relevant bugs — via a CODEOWNERS file.
Filed from the September 2026 client audit (CI pipeline review, branch lotus @ 4bea4895).
**Location:** repo settings (no branch protection on `lotus`, no `CODEOWNERS`), `README.md` "edit → commit → git push → ~11 min → live"
### Problem
This is a deliberate velocity trade-off and may be exactly right for the team size, so this issue is a decision point rather than a defect. As it stands, any collaborator's direct push to `lotus` reaches every user with no second pair of eyes; combined with the upstream-merge bypass it means production can change with zero review and zero CI.
### Suggested fix
At minimum, enable Gitea branch protection on `lotus` requiring the `Build & Quality Checks` status to pass before push (this alone closes the cancelled-run and merge-script gaps). Optionally require one approval for changes under `src/app/features/call`, `src/app/utils/searchCache.ts`, `src/app/state/sessions.ts`, and `src/client/` — the areas where this audit found the security-relevant bugs — via a `CODEOWNERS` file.
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_Filed from the September 2026 client audit (CI pipeline review, branch `lotus` @ 4bea4895)._
jared
added this to the Audit 2026-09 · Medium & Low milestone 2026-09-12 01:57:47 -04:00
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Location: repo settings (no branch protection on
lotus, noCODEOWNERS),README.md"edit → commit → git push → ~11 min → live"Problem
This is a deliberate velocity trade-off and may be exactly right for the team size, so this issue is a decision point rather than a defect. As it stands, any collaborator's direct push to
lotusreaches every user with no second pair of eyes; combined with the upstream-merge bypass it means production can change with zero review and zero CI.Suggested fix
At minimum, enable Gitea branch protection on
lotusrequiring theBuild & Quality Checksstatus to pass before push (this alone closes the cancelled-run and merge-script gaps). Optionally require one approval for changes undersrc/app/features/call,src/app/utils/searchCache.ts,src/app/state/sessions.ts, andsrc/client/— the areas where this audit found the security-relevant bugs — via aCODEOWNERSfile.Filed from the September 2026 client audit (CI pipeline review, branch
lotus@4bea4895).