Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Lotus CIandClaude Opus 5.5 14f05a3d5c fix(security): widget consents and shared files cleared on logout; forged shares refused (#266, #267)
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#266: remembered widget approvals (lotus.widgetConsent.*) survived logout,
so they applied silently to the next account on the device and listed the
previous account's rooms; clearPlaintextCaches now sweeps them. Space
structure, call membership and Lotus room-policy state join
PROTECTED_STATE_TYPES, so no widget can be granted them.

#267: any website could auto-submit a form to /share-target and land the
user in the share picker with attacker-chosen text and files. The worker
now refuses a share whose Origin is another site. (Sec-Fetch-Site, as the
issue suggested, never reaches a service worker: checked in Chromium.)
Origin null/absent, as the OS share sheet sends, stays accepted, and
/share now says the content came from another app or website. Both logout
paths await clearSharedPayload(); the server-forced one also clears the
soundboard clip cache, as #57 intended.

Fixes #266
Fixes #267

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017PCb59uY3UKqDqt7B6hzd5
2026-10-19 14:47:11 -04:00
Lotus CIandClaude Opus 5.5 c1661e48fa feat(widgets): ask before a room widget may read or send in the room (#205)
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Room widgets were limited to display-only capabilities because the driver
couldn't serve anything else. Now:

- classifyWidgetCapabilities: display caps are still granted silently; reading
  or sending events/state in the widget's OWN room is offered to the user;
  everything else (other rooms' timelines, to-device, account data, uploads,
  user directory, delayed events) stays denied. Writing protected state
  (power levels, join rules, encryption, membership, ACLs, widgets, …) is
  never offered, and the driver refuses it again at send time.
- WidgetPermissionPrompt names the widget, the host that runs it and who added
  it; each request in plain words ("Send messages of type m.text in this
  room · as you"); reading is pre-ticked, sending is not; Deny / Escape grant
  nothing extra. "Remember my choice" stores it per viewer (localStorage),
  tied to the widget URL, so a changed URL asks again.
- GeneralWidgetDriver implements sendEvent / readRoomTimeline / readRoomState
  / readEventRelations, each refusing any room but the widget's own;
  RoomWidgetView feeds the room's live (decrypted) events and state updates,
  which ClientWidgetApi forwards only if the widget holds the capability.

Verified in Chromium with a cross-origin test widget against a local Synapse:
power-levels and timeline:* requests are never shown; after allowing
send+read the widget's message lands on the server, its power-levels write
is rejected, it receives live messages, and after a reload the remembered
choice skips the prompt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PPmy3tPq869XDW4njjVaKA
2026-09-24 21:17:18 -04:00
jaredandClaude Opus 4.8 43f4ceb45d feat(rooms): Room Widgets (MSC1236 im.vector.modular.widgets)
Phase C.1 of the protocol-gaps roadmap, gate-green (693 tests). Generalizes the
Element Call widget host into a general room-widget feature:
- StateEvent.Widget + widgetsPanelAtom + useRoomWidgets (WidgetParser).
- RoomWidgetView: sandboxed-iframe host via ClientWidgetApi with a conservative
  GeneralWidgetDriver (approves only benign display caps — no room-event
  send/read/to-device). Blocks same-origin widget URLs (sandbox breakout guard).
- WidgetsPanel: list / open / add / remove, PL-gated on im.vector.modular.widgets,
  https + non-same-origin URL validation. Mounted like the media gallery (header
  toggle + 3-way content-panel exclusivity + mobile full-screen overlay).
- Tested URL/capability/id helpers.

Requires the prod CSP frame-src widening (matrix repo) for external widgets.
v1 cuts (capability consent prompt, Jitsi/sticker types, user widgets) noted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 13:27:23 -04:00