docs(todo): record inline-embed bug hunt — fixes + deferred items
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -233,6 +233,15 @@ The inline embed system (`videoEmbed.ts`) covers 16 providers; three more were *
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Also open (from the quality review): a real `onError`/error-state fallback for iframes that fail to load (deleted post / region lock / X login-wall) — cross-origin frames don't fire `onError` reliably, so this needs a load-timeout heuristic; the Close button + badge link are the current escape hatch.
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**✅ Embed bug hunt (2026-07, 3 survey agents + 2-agent review) — `f2673eff`.** Core posture verified **sound** (iframe sandbox, `useIframeAutoHeight` postMessage origin+source trust, no XSS/`dangerouslySetInnerHTML`, `rel="noreferrer"` on all 21 links, oEmbed no-SSRF, the whole facade→iframe/abort/observer lifecycle). Fixed: Twitch/Kick/SoundCloud/Streamable reserved-path over-match (utility pages rendered as broken players), Vimeo hash over-capture (`[0-9a-f]{6,}`), Spotify/Steam/Discord/IMDb `og:image` now via `mxcUrlToHttp` (was a broken raw `mxc://` `<img>` + a pre-click 3p-request facade bypass), `wide` class follows the og:url-resolved embed, Twitter host alignment (`mobile.twitter.com`/`/statuses/`), URL de-dupe.
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**Deferred / surfaced from the hunt (not fixed — decide before doing):**
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- **Security-vs-functionality tradeoff (needs a call):** drop `allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox` and/or `clipboard-write` from `EMBED_SANDBOX`/`allow=` on embed iframes — real hardening against a *compromised* provider (phishing popup / clipboard hijack), but risks breaking a legit provider popup/copy on the trusted major providers we embed. Low marginal value; not shipped blindly.
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- **Defense-in-depth:** `encodeURIComponent` the Bluesky authority + Apple Music path/search interpolated into the embed `src` (not currently exploitable — host is fixed and value comes from `URL.pathname`; React escapes the attribute).
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- **Out of embed scope (real, low-sev):** `LotusDenoiseFeature` (`ClientNonUIFeatures.tsx`) has a `window` `message` listener with **no origin/source check** → any frame/window can post `{type:'lotus-denoise-status', error}` and pop a forged **"System"** toast (text only, no XSS). Validate `event.source`.
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- **Lifecycle Lows (cosmetic/latent):** a re-fetch flips a playing embed back to the spinner (latent — url is keyed); auto-height retained across close→reopen; `extractEmbedHeight` generic `.height` fallback accepts any allowed-origin message; `TweetEmbed` theme is a one-time `matchMedia` snapshot (no live theme switch); host-normalization gaps (`vt.tiktok.com` misses `StackOnMobile`, `m.instagram.com`, `www.youtu.be`).
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### Deferred / dropped (decided — kept for context)
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- **[DEFERRED] P5-51** Federated "Identity Contexts" (session isolation) — multi-sprint, touches auth/crypto/storage core; smaller intermediate step = plain multi-account switch. **[DROPPED] P5-52** per-room sync governor — js-sdk can't truly per-room filter `/sync`; only a cosmetic hide. **[DEFERRED] P5-53** local scripting plugin — prefer a declarative automation-rules feature (no arbitrary code). **[DEFERRED] Audit-3** profile banner — MSC4427 open/unmerged; revisit on merge. **[WON'T FIX] P5-50** Windows HW media pipeline (WebRTC decode lives in WebView2; not injectable). **[MOVED] P5-9** LFG → LotusBot `!lfg`.
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