feat(e2ee): undecryptable placeholder says why and offers the fix (#159)
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'Unable to decrypt message' now carries one sentence per matrix-js-sdk DecryptionFailureCode (describeDecryptionFailure, unit-tested against every code so no raw code can leak into the copy) and, where something fixes it, one button: no key backup → 'Set up key backup'; backup exists but this session can't open it / key withheld for an unverified session → 'Unlock key backup' / 'Verify this session' (both open Settings → Devices via a new settingsRequestAtom that SettingsTab consumes); backup working or unknown session (rust-crypto re-requests keys itself) → 'Retry', which re-runs decryptEventIfNeeded. Sender-side problems are plain text. The raw code sits in the placeholder's tooltip for support. Verified headless on a fresh session in the encrypted seed room: each event shows 'Sent before you signed in here, and no key backup exists…' with tooltip HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP; the button opens Settings → Devices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PPmy3tPq869XDW4njjVaKA
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import { test } from 'node:test';
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import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
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import { DecryptionFailureCode } from 'matrix-js-sdk/lib/crypto-api';
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import { describeDecryptionFailure } from './decryptionReason';
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test('every SDK failure code maps to a sentence without the raw code in it', () => {
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Object.values(DecryptionFailureCode).forEach((code) => {
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const r = describeDecryptionFailure(code);
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assert.ok(r.text.length > 10, code);
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assert.ok(!r.text.includes(code), `raw code leaked for ${code}`);
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assert.ok(!/[A-Z_]{8,}/.test(r.text), `shouty code-like text for ${code}: ${r.text}`);
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if (r.action !== 'none') assert.ok(r.actionLabel, `action without label for ${code}`);
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});
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});
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test('the fixable cases carry the right action', () => {
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assert.equal(
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describeDecryptionFailure(DecryptionFailureCode.HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP).action,
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'setup-backup',
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);
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assert.equal(
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describeDecryptionFailure(DecryptionFailureCode.HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED).action,
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'verify-session',
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);
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assert.equal(
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describeDecryptionFailure(DecryptionFailureCode.HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP).action,
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'retry',
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);
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assert.equal(
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describeDecryptionFailure(DecryptionFailureCode.MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE)
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.action,
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'verify-session',
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);
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assert.equal(
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describeDecryptionFailure(DecryptionFailureCode.MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID).action,
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'retry',
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);
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assert.equal(
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describeDecryptionFailure(DecryptionFailureCode.UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE).action,
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'none',
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);
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assert.equal(describeDecryptionFailure(undefined).action, 'none');
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assert.equal(describeDecryptionFailure('SOMETHING_NEW').text, 'Unable to decrypt this message.');
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});
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import { DecryptionFailureCode } from 'matrix-js-sdk/lib/crypto-api';
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/**
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* [Gitea #159] What to tell the user about an undecryptable message, and the
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* one thing that fixes it (if anything does). Raw codes never reach the UI
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* text — they go in the tooltip for support.
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*/
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export type DecryptionAction = 'setup-backup' | 'retry' | 'verify-session' | 'none';
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export type DecryptionReason = {
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text: string;
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action: DecryptionAction;
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actionLabel?: string;
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};
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export const describeDecryptionFailure = (
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code: DecryptionFailureCode | string | null | undefined,
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): DecryptionReason => {
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switch (code) {
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case DecryptionFailureCode.HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP:
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// No backup exists on the server at all: this key is gone for this
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// session (another signed-in device may still share it), and the fix is
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// for the future.
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return {
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text: 'Sent before you signed in here, and no key backup exists — set one up so your next session can read history.',
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action: 'setup-backup',
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actionLabel: 'Set up key backup',
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};
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case DecryptionFailureCode.HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED:
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// A backup exists but this session can't open it (needs the recovery key
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// / verification).
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return {
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text: "Sent before you signed in here. Your key backup exists but this session can't open it yet.",
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action: 'verify-session',
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actionLabel: 'Unlock key backup',
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};
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case DecryptionFailureCode.HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP:
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return {
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text: 'Waiting for the key from your backup…',
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action: 'retry',
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actionLabel: 'Retry',
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};
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case DecryptionFailureCode.HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_USER_NOT_JOINED:
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return { text: 'Sent before you joined this room.', action: 'none' };
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case DecryptionFailureCode.MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE:
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return {
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text: "The sender's device won't share keys with unverified sessions.",
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action: 'verify-session',
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actionLabel: 'Verify this session',
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};
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case DecryptionFailureCode.MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD:
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return { text: 'The sender chose not to share the key for this message.', action: 'none' };
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case DecryptionFailureCode.MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID:
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case DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX:
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// rust-crypto re-requests the key from our other devices by itself
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// (there is no public re-request API any more); a retry re-runs the
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// decryption in case it has arrived since.
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return {
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text: "This session doesn't have the key yet — it is being requested from your other devices.",
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action: 'retry',
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actionLabel: 'Retry',
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};
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case DecryptionFailureCode.SENDER_IDENTITY_PREVIOUSLY_VERIFIED:
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return {
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text: "The sender's identity changed since you verified them — re-verify to read this.",
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action: 'none',
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};
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case DecryptionFailureCode.UNSIGNED_SENDER_DEVICE:
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return { text: "Sent from a device the sender hasn't verified.", action: 'none' };
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case DecryptionFailureCode.UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE:
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return { text: "Sent from a device we don't know about.", action: 'none' };
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default:
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return { text: 'Unable to decrypt this message.', action: 'none' };
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}
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};
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